信号交叉口上游路段网联车换道博弈特性及模型
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491.253

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国家自然科学基金(52272311, 62003182);山东省重点研发项目(2019GGX101038)


Characterization and model of Connected and Automated Vehicles lane changing game on upstream sections of signalized intersections
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    摘要:

    为提高网联驾驶车辆在信号交叉口上游路段与驾驶员车辆换道博弈的主动性,以左转网联驾驶车辆为研究对象分析该路段的强制换道博弈特性。首先,通过分析信号交叉口上游路段车辆的行驶意图和换道行为,设定驾驶人期望函数来客观反映车辆的行驶需求,以车辆的安全和行驶效率为收益并进行量化,在完全信息的假设下通过博弈均衡解得到最优换道决策来实现换道收益最大化;其次,为提高换道的舒适性,以五次多项式规划换道轨迹并实现网联驾驶车辆对驾驶员车辆博弈换道的过程;最后,利用仿真试验对模型进行验证,分析不同换道位置和绿灯剩余时间等因素对网联驾驶车辆决策的影响。研究结果表明,在信号交叉口上游非合作博弈强制换道过程中,随单位换道位置增加换道概率平均增加0.69%,随单位绿灯剩余时间增加车辆换道概率平均降低0.82%。通过仿真分析信号交叉口上游路段车辆的博弈换道特性和决策倾向,有利于为网联驾驶车辆换道提供决策引导。

    Abstract:

    In order to improve the initiative of lane changing game between Connected and Automated Vehicles and drivers vehicles in the upstream section of the signalized intersection, the left-turn Connected and Automated Vehicle is taken as the research object to analyze the characteristics of the forced lane change game in this section. Firstly, by analyzing the driving intention and lane change behavior of vehicles in the upstream section of the signalized intersections, the driver's expectation function was set to objectively reflect the driving demand of the vehicle, and the safety and driving efficiency of the vehicle were taken as the benefits and quantified. Under the assumption of complete information, the optimal lane changing decision was obtained through the game equilibrium solution to maximize the lane changing benefit. Secondly, in order to improve the comfort of lane changing, a five-degree polynomial was used to plan the lane change trajectory and the game lane changing process between Connected and Automated Vehicles and driver vehicles is realized. Finally, the simulation test was used to verify the model, and the influence of different lane changing positions and remaining green time on the decision-making of Connected and Automated Vehicles were analyzed. The results indicate that in the process of non-cooperative game forced lane changing at signalized intersection, the lane changing probability increases by an average of 0.69 % with the increase of the unit lane change position, and the vehicle lane changing probability decreases by an average of 0.82 % with the increase of the unit green light remaining time. The game lane changing characteristics and decision tendency of vehicles on upstream sections of signalized intersections are analyzed by simulation, which is conducive to providing decision guidance for lane changing of Connected and Automated Vehicles.

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戴守晨,曲大义,王其坤,等. 信号交叉口上游路段网联车换道博弈特性及模型[J]. 科学技术与工程, 2023, 23(10): 4408-4416.
Dai Shouchen, Qu Dayi, Wang Qikun, et al. Characterization and model of Connected and Automated Vehicles lane changing game on upstream sections of signalized intersections[J]. Science Technology and Engineering,2023,23(10):4408-4416.

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  • 收稿日期:2022-07-30
  • 最后修改日期:2023-04-07
  • 录用日期:2022-11-24
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-04-27
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