基于演化博弈的地铁施工人员不安全行为动态惩罚策略优化
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

U231.1

基金项目:

湖南省应急管理厅2018年安全生产科技研究及推广项目;长沙理工大学道路灾变防治及交通安全教育部工程研究中心开放基金自主项目(kfj180403)


Optimization of dynamic punishment strategy for unsafe behavior of subway construction workers based on evolutionary game
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    为有效减少地铁施工人员不安全行为,提高安全管理制度有效性,本文从地铁施工人员与安全管理人员双方的利益动机出发,构建不安全行为惩罚的演化博弈模型,通过SD模型对双方博弈的演化趋势进行仿真模拟,最后提出能够降低不安全行为的策略。研究结果表明:两方博弈模型的均衡解不具有演化稳定性,且增大惩罚力度只能在短期内减少不安全行为,而重复博弈上下震荡的频率更大,安全管理检查更加困难;引入动态惩罚机制并优化可以达到稳定的演化均衡,在有效抑制波动的同时减少不安全行为发生,达到最稳定状态,获得稳定策略,在不检查的情况下,施工人员选择安全行为,降低事故发生的可能性,本研究为制定有效的惩罚制度提供了一定的参考。

    Abstract:

    In order to effectively reduce the unsafe behavior of subway construction workers and improve the effectiveness of safety management system, this paper starts from the interest motivation of both subway construction workers and safety management personnel, constructs an evolutionary game model of unsafe behavior inspection, simulates the evolution trend of the game between the two parties by using SD model, and finally puts forward strategies to reduce unsafe behavior. The results show that the equilibrium solution of the two-party game model has no evolutionary stability, and increasing the punishment can only reduce unsafe behavior in a short time, while the frequency of repeated games fluctuates more frequently, making safety management inspection more difficult; The introduction of dynamic punishment mechanism can suppress fluctuations and achieve stable evolutionary equilibrium, but construction workers still have certain unsafe behaviors; The dynamic punishment mechanism is optimized, which can effectively restrain fluctuations and reduce unsafe behaviors, achieve the most stable state and obtain stable strategies. Without inspection, construction workers choose safe behaviors, thus reducing accidents. This study provides a certain reference for formulating effective punishment system.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

陈赟,刘慧琳. 基于演化博弈的地铁施工人员不安全行为动态惩罚策略优化[J]. 科学技术与工程, 2022, 22(13): 5506-5512.
Chen Yun, Liu Huilin. Optimization of dynamic punishment strategy for unsafe behavior of subway construction workers based on evolutionary game[J]. Science Technology and Engineering,2022,22(13):5506-5512.

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2021-09-05
  • 最后修改日期:2022-04-16
  • 录用日期:2021-12-17
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-05-20
  • 出版日期:
×
律回春渐,新元肇启|《科学技术与工程》编辑部恭祝新岁!
亟待确认版面费归属稿件,敬请作者关注